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Abstract We assessed calibration of perception and action
in the context of a golf putting task. Previous research has
shown that right-handed novice golfers make rightward
errors both in the perception of the perfect aiming line from
the ball to the hole and in the putting action. Right-handed
experts, however, produce accurate putting actions but tend
to make leftward errors in perception. In two experiments,
we examined whether these skill-related differences in
directional error reflect transfer of calibration from action
to perception. In the main experiment, three groups of right-
handed novice participants followed a pretest, practice,
posttest, retention test design. During the tests, directional
error for the putting action and the perception of the perfect
aiming line were determined. During practice, participants
were provided only with verbal outcome feedback about
directional error; one group trained perception and the
second trained action, whereas the third group did not
practice. Practice led to a relatively permanent annihilation
of directional error, but these improvements in accuracy
were specific to the trained task. Hence, no transfer of
calibration occurred between perception and action. The
findings are discussed within the two-visual-system model
for perception and action, and implications for perceptual
learning in action are raised.
Keywords Perceptual learning.Far aiming.Calibration.
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Introduction
In putting, right-handed novice golfers who stand to the left
side of the ball make systematic directional errors to the
right of the hole (Johnston, Benton & Nishida, 2003;
Roberts & Turnbull, 2010; Van Lier, Van der Kamp &
Savelsbergh, 2011). These putting errors by novice golfers
appear to be predicated on the misperception of the
direction of the perfect aim line between the ball and the
hole, although the rightward errors in perception are smaller
than the rightward putting errors. Intriguingly, although
skilled golfers aim accurately when putting, they tend to
make leftward errors in the perception of the perfect aim
line (see Fig. 1). Van Lier et al. argued that skilled golfers
had managed to overcome the rightward errors by a process
of calibration, during which they presumably adjusted the
relation between directional information and the control of
the orientation of the club head relative to ball. They further
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suggest that this calibration of putting action transferred to
the perception of direction. The nature of a learning
process, however, cannot be conclusively inferred from
performance differences between groups of different skill
levels. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that the skilled
participants in the study by Van Lier et al. had first
calibrated the perception of direction and subsequently
transferred this calibration into the putting action. In order
to address these issues, the present study employed a
learning experiment during which novice golfers learned to
overcome the directional errors in the perception of the
perfect aim line or in the putting action by practicing either
the perceptual judgments or the putting action.
The first purpose of this study was to verify whether
learning to aim a golf putt indeed is consistent with a
process of calibration. From an ecological approach,
calibration is defined as the scaling or adjustment of an
action or perceptual judgment to the information that is
used. That is, proponents of the ecological approach argue
that for any task, a lawful relation exists between
information (i.e., I(t)) and task (i.e., T(t)) variables (Warren,
1988; see also Van der Kamp, Oudejans & Savelsbergh,
2003). In its simplest appearance, this so-called law of
control is formally expressed as
T t ðÞ¼ a þ b»IðtÞ; ð1Þ
in which T(t) stands for a particular task variable (e.g., in the
case of putting, the orientation of the club head at impact,
or in the case of a perceptual judgment, the perception of
the direction of a line), I(t) stands for a particular
information variable (e.g., an optic variable specifying the
direction toward the hole), and a and b stand for constants
that reflect the precise relationship between the task and
information variables. Calibration refers to a change in the
relation between the task and optic variables by tuning of
the constants a and b (Jacobs & Michaels, 2007; Withagen
& Michaels, 2005; for an alternative theoretical account of
calibration, see, e.g., Ernst & Banks, 2002).
A popular paradigm for examining the process of
calibration has been the use of wedge prisms (e.g., Redding
& Wallace, 1997). By laterally displacing the field of view,
wedge prisms artificially manipulate the relation between
informational and task variables. Martin, Keating, Goodkin,
Bastian and Thach (1996), for example, examined partic-
ipants’ adjustments in throwing direction after donning
prisms. Initially, participants made large directional errors in
line with the artificial lateral displacement, but they rapidly
adapted to the optical distortion. The directional errors had
been reduced to zero within 10 to 30 throws. After removal
of the prisms, negative aftereffects occurred (i.e., throwing
errors in the opposite direction), which indicates that the
short-term learning involved a realignment of the relation-
ship between the exploited informational variables and the
aiming action (e.g., Redding & Wallace, 1997; Willingham,
1998). This points to calibration, rather than a shift in the
use of informational variables.
A similar process of calibration was proposed by Van Lier
et al. (2011) to explain golfers’ improvement in directional
putting accuracy with increases in skill level. Yet the origin
of the perceptual distortion in golf putting may be crucially
different from that in the prism studies. In the prisms
studies, errors in perceived direction are artificially induced
and usually short-lived, whereas the directional errors in
golf putting (or in the perceived direction of the perfect
aiming line) occur more generally and are relatively
persistent (Cuijpers, Kappers & Koenderink, 2000). This
raises the question of whether, indeed, the directional
inaccuracies in putting that emerged from this intrinsic bias
or dynamics (see Kelso, 1995) are as easily amendable as
the artificially induced errors in the prisms studies.
The second purpose of this study was to scrutinize
whether calibration of putting direction generalizes to
perceptual judgments of the direction of the perfect aiming
line and/or vice versa. To test this, we provided two groups
of novice golfers who made consistent and systematic
directional errors feedback about the direction and magni-
tude of the error, while they were either practicing golf
putting or practicing perceptual judgments. In subsequent
posttests and retention tests, we assessed transfer of
calibration. Some have argued that transfer of calibration
between tasks occurs if, and only if, the tasks are
functionally similar—that is, share the same purpose (e.g.,
Rieser, Pick, Ashmead & Garing, 1995; Withagen &
Fig. 1 Directional errors in the
putting action (dashed lines) and
the perception of the perfect
aiming line (plain lines) for
novice and skilled golfers
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Martin et al. (1996) found that adaptation to prisms was
specific for the throwing limb (i.e., no transfer of
calibration occurred from the right to the left hand) and
throwing pattern (i.e., no transfer occurred between
overhand and underhand throws), despite these tasks being
functionally similar. By contrast, Withagen and Michaels
(2002, 2004) provided support for the functional hypothesis
for transfer of calibration in both motor tasks and
perceptual tasks. For example, it was shown that calibration
of walking (i.e., the relation between moving speed and
optical flow field was realigned by having participants walk
on a treadmill in a virtual environment) transferred to
crawling. Although different limbs are involved, walking
and crawling are locomotor tasks with the same functional
goal (i.e., to move from one place to another). In a second
study, Withagen and Michaels (2004) demonstrated transfer
of calibration of rod length perception from the right hand
to the left hand. Hence, with respect to the present study, the
issue is whether the putting action and the perception of
direction can be considered as functionally similar tasks (e.g.,
both of them entail obtaining information for directional
judgments of the perfect aiming line). In this respect, the
influential two-visual-system model of Milner and Goodale
(1995, 2008); see also Van der Kamp, Rivas, van Doorn &
Savelsbergh, 2008; for a contrasting view, see Franz,
Gegenfurtner, Bülthoff & Fahle, 2000)p r o p o s e dt h a tt h e
use of information for action (e.g., the control of the
orientation of the club head in putting) and its use for
perception (e.g., obtaining knowledge on the direction of the
perfect aiming line) are functionally distinct and supported
by separate neuroanatomical systems. This provides a reason
to suspect that transfer of calibration will not occur between
the putting action and the perception of direction. The
empirical evidence supporting Milner and Goodale’sc l a i mo f
functionally and neurologically dissociated systems for
action and perception, however, is largely confined to
observations in real time—that is, for tasks performed on
the time scale of seconds (but see Gonzalez, Ganel,
Whitwell, Morrissey & Goodale, 2008). Hence, it remains
to be seen whether independence also applies to changes on
longer time scales of learning.
By contrast, others have argued that perception and action
are tightly integrated and use similar information (e.g.,
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben & Prinz, 2001; Prinz,
1997, 2006). Within the common-coding theory, this is
conceptualized as perception and action sharing common
codes or representations. The notion of common codes for
perception and action is corroborated by neuropsycholog-
ical evidence that specialized neural pathways exist (i.e.,
the mirror neuron system) that respond during both action
and perception (e.g., Blakemore & Frith, 2005; Rizzolatti &
Craighero, 2004). Hence, to the extent that the putting
action and the perception of direction are, indeed, tasks that
exploit common codes or use the same information, a
strong argument can be made that improvements in putting
direction following a process of calibration would transfer
to the perception of direction and vice versa.
We report two experiments. Experiment 1 sets the stage
by examining the circumstances in which directional errors
are most likely to occur consistently and reliably. Subse-
quently, in Experiment 2, these circumstances were
exploited to examine whether augmented feedback on the
direction of putting and perceptual errors would induce a
process of calibration and to examine whether transfer of
calibration would occur between putting direction and
perception of direction of the perfect aiming line.
Experiment 1
Obviously, learning can take place only when systematic
and consistent errors exist. Previous work has shown that
systematic rightward error in perceived direction occurs at
the group level (Johnston et al., 2003; Van Lier et al., 2011),
but it has also been suggested that inter- and intraindividual
differences transpire in the magnitude of the perceptual
distortion (e.g., Cuijpers et al., 2000, 2003; Koenderink &
van Doorn, 1998; Koenderink, van Doorn & Lappin, 2000,
2003). For example, in golf, the exact position of the eyes
(i.e., line of sight), relative to the perfect aim line, affected
the magnitude of the perceived directional error (Van Lier et
al., 2011). The directional errors occurred only when the
eyes were positioned next to the ball and above the hands
(positions H3 and H4, Fig. 2), but not when they were
directly above the ball (position P, Fig. 2). Van Lier et al.
attributed this increase to there being a larger angle between
the line of sight and the perpendicular to the plane in which
the direction of the perfect aim line was to be judged.
However, alternative explanations, such as the absolute
distance or lateral distance (see Fig. 2) between the eyes
and the ball, cannot be ruled out. Hence, in Experiment 1,
we assessed what head (and eye) position resulted in the
most consistent and reliable errors in perceived direction for
the individual participants by evaluating the effect of
varying the angle between the line of sight and the ground
plane and the lateral, vertical, and absolute distances
between eyes and ball.
Method
Participants Ten right-handed novice golfers (mean age =
21.9 ± 2.7 years) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
volunteered to participate in the experiment. They provided
informed consent prior to the experiment and were treated
in accordance with the local institution’s ethical guidelines.
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based on earlier work by Van Lier et al. (2011). A
triangular-shaped level platform was used that was covered
with an artificial grass from synthetic turf (GreenFields,
Genemuiden, The Netherlands). The green was approxi-
mately 4 m long and 2 m wide. The green was cleaned prior
to the experiment in order to prevent the presence of any
landmarks that might be used as a reference. Additionally,
black plastic sheeting, which hung from the ceiling,
covered the edges of the green. The sheeting was wrinkled,
creating irregular cavities and protrusions so as to minimize
any salient reference points for the participants. At a
distance of 1.80 m from the hole, a pointer was placed
2 cm above the artificial green. The pointer consisted of a
golf ball from which a 3-mm-thick needle stuck out 15 cm
from the ball’s front and 10 cm from its back. The pointer
could be rotated in a stepwise fashion, using two hand-held
switches that fed into a computer. The hand-held switches
controlled a servomotor that was connected to the pointer
and placed underneath the green. The rotation speed of the
pointer was 6°/s when the pointer’s front was more than 20°
off-target at the time the switch was pressed but was
reduced to 1°/s when it was within 20° off the target. The
precision of the pointer was 0.06°.
To consistently vary the position of the head and eyes in
relation to the pointer, an adjustable head support was used,
which consisted of an adjustable stand bearing a small
wooden ball (i.e., 3 cm in diameter). The participants were
instructed to keep the back of their head to the adjustable
wooden ball, thereby creating four head and eye positions
that varied in height (i.e., at 75 and 150 cm) and lateral
distance (i.e., 75 and 150 cm) relative to the pointer
(Fig. 2). Alongside, the angle between the line of sight and
the perpendicular to the plane in which the directional
judgment was made (i.e., 30°, 45°, 60°) and the absolute
distance between the eyes and the pointer (i.e., 106, 168,
212 cm) were varied.
Procedure and design The participants stood to the left side
of the ball and were instructed, prior to each trial, to contact
the head support with the back of their head (i.e.,
protuberantia occipitalis externa). During the trial, they
were allowed to move their head freely (i.e., to look from
the pointer to the hole and vice versa) but had to keep their
head close to the head support. For the two low head
positions (i.e., positions H1 and H2), participants rested on
their knees, while for the two high positions (i.e., positions
H3 and H4), they stood as they would do when addressing
a ball in order to putt.
At the start of each trial, the pointer was automatically
placed in a random orientation between 30° and 60° to
either the right or left of the hole. This was changed from
trial to trial and prevented participants from making
judgments relative to the initial pointer orientation on the
current trial and/or the final pointer orientation on the
previous trial. Participants were first instructed on how to
rotate the pointer by pressing the two hand-held switches.
Pressing the switch in the left hand resulted in the pointer’s
rotating in a clockwise direction, while pressing the switch
in the right hand made the pointer rotate in a counterclock-
wise direction. Participants were then instructed to rotate
the pointer such that it pointed to the center of the hole,
which was indicated by the foot of a flagpole. The pointer’s
exact orientation with respect to the perfect aiming line was
registered by a computer once the participants verbally
indicated that they had positioned the pointer correctly.
The four head position conditions were administered in
blocks of 12 trials in a counterbalanced order across
participants. Participants did not receive any knowledge of
results during the experiment.
Data reduction and statistics Theerrorinperceiveddirection
served as the dependent variable. It was defined as the angle
between the direction of the pointer and the direction of the
true line between the ball and the hole (i.e., perfect aiming
line).Anegativeangleindicatedacounterclockwiseerror(i.e.,
leftward error), whereas a positive angle indicated a clockwise
error (i.e., rightward error). To test whether the individual
participants made consistent and systematic errors in per-
ceived direction, we used one-sample t-tests with the Šidák
correction for multiple comparisons to assess whether the
error in perceived direction was different from zero (i.e., no
error) for each participant and head position separately. In
addition, individual regression analyses were conducted to
examine which factor or combination of factors contributed
most to the directional error.
Fig. 2 Schematic representation of the head positions H1 to H4 as
used in Experiment 1. P indicates the point straight above the ball and
perpendicular to the plane in which the direction of the perfect aim
line was to be judged
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Figure 3 shows the pattern of errors in perceived direction
for 3 individual participants. The interindividual differences
immediately stand out. For example, participant P3 shows
larger errors for head positions at larger heights (i.e., H3
and H4). This is also the case for participant P7, but with
the errors in the opposite direction (i.e., leftward instead of
rightward errors). For participant P5, however, the error in
perceived direction was chiefly affected by lateral distance,
with larger rightward errors for head positions H2 and H4.
Notwithstanding these interindividual differences, t-tests
revealed that errors in perceived direction most consistently
and reliably occurred for head position H4. That is,
8 participants showed a significant error, 7 of whom made
the anticipated rightward error, ts(11) > 3.2, ps < .01, while
1 participant made a significant error to the left of the hole,
t(11) = 15.7, p < .01. The 1 final participant did not produce
a significant error for head position H4, t(11) = 1.9 , p > .05.
Three to 5 participants made significant errors in perceived
direction for the other three head positions. The source of
the interindividual differences remains uncertain; the
regression analysis outcomes point to the individual
participants’ errors in perceived direction being related
differently to angle between the line of sight and the
perpendicular to the plane in which the pointer was rotated
and the vertical, lateral, and absolute distances between the
eyes and the pointer (Table 1). Previous work had pointed
to the angle between the line of sight and the perpendicular
to the plane in which the judgment was made as the most
important determinant for the size of the error in perceived
direction (Van Lier et al., 2011). However, none of the
individual patterns of error was in line with this suggestion.
Finally, we conclude that the largest combined vertical and
lateral distance between the eyes and the ball (i.e., head
position H4) most reliably resulted in errors in perceived
direction (although not completely consistent across partic-
ipants). We therefore used this head position in Experiment 2
to assess learning.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 investigated whether augmented outcome
feedback induces relatively permanent changes in putting
and perception. Previous work has shown that outcome
feedback (or knowledge of results) on the magnitude and
sign of error aids the learner in enhancing calibration of an
informational variable to a task variable (i.e., I(t) and T(t) in
Eq. 1; see, e.g., Cabe & Wagman, 2010; Wagman, McBride
& Trefzger, 2008; Withagen & Michaels, 2005). Wagman et
al. (see also Gibson & Bergman, 1954) argued that such
calibration is revealed in increases in accuracy and consis-
tency of performance. In a series of length perception
studies, it was found that improvements in the accuracy of
performance (i.e., as indicated by a change in constant error)
were conditional upon the presenceofoutcome feedback.By
contrast, improvements in the consistency or variability of
performance (i.e., as indicated by a change in variable error)
occurred irrespective of the presence of feedback; only a few
repetitions without feedback apparently sufficed.
Fig. 3 Errors in perceived direction as a function of head positions
H1 to H4 for 3 individual participants (P2, P7, P3) in Experiment 1.
Positive and negative errors indicate leftward and rightward errors,
respectively
Table 1 Outcomes for the regression analysis for the individual
participants, displaying the variable that entered the regression
equation and the corresponding coefficient
Participant Variables Entered Beta Coefficients
P1 height 0.52
P2 absolute distance 0.59
P3 height 0.51
P4 none –
P5 lateral distance 0.71
P6 lateral distance 0.73
P7 height −0.61
P8 lateral distance 0.71
P9 absolute distance −0.41
P10 none –
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received outcome feedback on the magnitude and sign of
the directional errors they made while practicing either
putting or perception with their head positioned at a large
vertical and lateral distance from the ball (i.e., position H4
per Experiment 1). A pretest, practice, posttest, and
retention test design followed. We hypothesized that
outcome feedback induces calibration, which would result
in enhanced performance accuracy and increased consis-
tency (i.e., reduced variability) at the posttest and retention
test, relative to the pretest. Our chief interest, however, was
in whether calibration induced by putting practice with
outcome feedback would transfer to perception and, vice
versa, whether calibration due to perception training with
feedback would transfer to putting. We expected transfer of
calibration to occur to the degree that the tasks had
functional characteristics in common (e.g., they crucially
depended on accurate information, or codes, about the
direction of perfect aiming line; see Hommel et al., 2001;
Prinz, 1997; see also Van Lier et al., 2011). We expected the
transfer to be restricted to performance accuracy and not to
comprise consistency, because an increase in consistency
requires at least a limited amount of repetitions. Alterna-
tively, however, following Milner and Goodale (1995,
2008; see also Withagen & Michaels, 2004), the putting
action and perception task may be considered as function-
ally separate, which would rule out the possibility that
transfer of calibration between the tasks would occur.
Method
Participants Thirty-nine right-handed novice golfers with
normal or corrected-to-normal vision volunteered to partic-
ipate. In order to ensure that participants were unskilled,
nine volunteers were excluded from further participation in
the experiment because they sunk more than four out of ten
putts during the pretest (see the Procedure section below).
Five more participants were excluded after completion of
the experiment because the average constant errors in the
putting and/or perception task during the pretest did not
exceed zero. Finally, due to technical failure, the data for 1
participant were lost. The remaining participants were
randomly assigned to the perception-training group (n =9 ;
mean age = 22.2 ± 2.8 years), the action-training group
(n = 8; mean age = 23.4 ± 3.0 years), and the control group
(n = 8; mean age = 25.0 ± 4.6 years). The volunteers
received a small monetary fee and were treated in accordance
with the local institution’s ethical guidelines.
Materials and apparatus For the perception task, the same
pointer was used as per Experiment 1. The putting task was
performed on the same platform, which was prepared prior
to testing to ensure that the ball roll was unaffected (i.e., a
speed of 14 Stimp). Using standard golf balls, participants
had to perform putts using a specially fitted long conven-
tional putter. The length (1.21 m) and lie angle (50°) of the
putter allowed one to make putts comfortably while
standing with the head positioned at 1.50 m above and
next to the ball (i.e., position H4 in Experiment 1). The
adjustable head support (see Experiment 1) was used to
assist participants in maintaining this position.
Liquid crystal goggles (Plato Translucent Technologies,
Toronto, Canada) were used to remove visual feedback
about task outcome. During the perception task, the goggles
turned opaque after the participants indicated that they had
rotated the pointer in the desired position, and in the putting
task, the goggles turned opaque the moment the ball
interrupted a light beam of a photoelectric switch (Omron
E3S-R 30E4), which was positioned perpendicular to the
ball path at 40 cm from the initial ball position. The hole
was covered with a white artificial grass plug to eliminate
auditory feedback from the ball entering the hole.
Two digital video cameras (Panasonic 25 Hz interlaced
PAL) were used. One camera was positioned directly above
the ball and was used to determine the initial direction of
the ball roll. The second camera with a transparent visor
was placed behind the ball, directly in line with the ball–
hole direction. Its recordings were displayed on a monitor
to provide verbal feedback about the distance the ball
passed next to the hole during the putting task (i.e., this
reflects the magnitude and sign of the directional error). To
this end, a foot-rule was drawn on the monitor in such a
manner that it precisely overlapped the line through the
center of the hole that was perpendicular to the perfect aim
line. The foot-rule indicated intervals corresponding to
5 cm on the platform.
Procedure and design Participants were randomly assigned
to one of three groups on the basis of their pretest
performance. The perception- and action-training groups
followed a pretest, practice, posttest, retention test design.
The control group, however, did not receive practice.
Participants first performed the pretest, which was followed
by three practice sessions that took place at separate days.
The posttest was performed on the same day as the third
practice session, with a 15-min break in between. Finally,
the retention test was conducted between 2 and 4 days after
the posttest.
During the pretest, posttest, and retention test, the
participants performed a block of 12 perception trials and
a block of 12 putting trials, the order of which was
counterbalanced across participants. The tests were admin-
istered in two bouts of 6 trials. The perception task was
similar to that in in Experiment 1. That is, the participants
rotated the pointer such that it pointed to the center of the
hole. In the putting task, participants attempted to putt the
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goggles to ensure that visual feedback of the task outcome
could not be used to improve performance on the
subsequent trial. In the perception task, the glasses turned
opaque after the participants indicated that they had rotated
the pointer in the desired position. In the putting task, the
goggles turned opaque at the moment the ball had traveled
40 cm in the direction of the hole. Participants did not
receive augmented feedback during the test trials. Partic-
ipants were constrained to consistently position the head at
a height of 150 cm and a lateral distance of 150 cm, relative
to the pointer or the ball (i.e., head position H4 in
Experiment 1). Although they were allowed to move their
head in order to look from the pointer or the ball to the hole
and vice versa, they had to keep it as close as possible to
the head support. After completion of a trial (i.e., after the
glasses were closed), the participant turned his or her back
to the hole until the experimenter opened the goggles. This
was the sign to prepare for the next trial.
During each of the three practice sessions, the partic-
ipants in the action-training group performed 48 putting
trials, while the participants in the perception-training group
performed 48 perception trials. These sessions were
administered in bouts of 6 trials, in between which
participants were allowed to take short rests to prevent
fatigue and to relax. The procedure was similar to that in
the pretest, posttest, and retention test, but the participants
now received verbal augmented feedback on the magnitude
and sign of the directional error after each trial. Feedback
was provided in intervals of 5 cm distance to the left or
right from the center of the hole. To this end, the directional
error in degrees for the perception task was directly
converted into distances from the hole’s center. Specifically,
(1) when the pointer was rotated or the ball passed within
5 cm of the center of the hole, participants were told that it
pointed to or passed “in the hole to the left or right from the
center”; (2) when the pointer pointed to or the ball passed
the hole within 30 cm of its center, participants were told
that it pointed or passed the corresponding 5 cm interval to
the left or right from the center of the hole; (3) when the
pointer pointed to or the ball passed more than 30 cm from
the centr of the hole, the participants were told “more than
30 cm to the left or right from the center.” Before each
practice session, participants were briefly informed of the
feedback procedure.
Data reduction and statistics The error in perceived
direction (in degrees) was defined as the angle between
the direction of the pointer and the direction of the true line
between the ball and the hole (i.e., perfect aim line). A
custom-made semiautomatic video-analyzing program, de-
veloped with the Matlab® Image Processing Toolbox, was
used to digitalize the path of the ball and its direction for
the first ten frames (i.e., 400 ms) after contact. The error in
putt direction was defined as the angle between the
direction of ball roll and the true line between the ball
and hole. Negative angles for the errors in perceived and
putting direction indicated a leftward or counterclockwise
error, while positive angles indicated a rightward or
clockwise error.
As in Experiment 1, perusal of the pretest data showed
that most participants made reliable and consistent right-
ward errors in both the perception and putting tasks. Yet one
participant made consistent leftward errors in both tasks,
whereas a second participant made leftward errors in the
perception task and rightward errors in the putting task. To
make sure that these interindividual differences in the sign
of the directional error and the changes therein as a function
of practice did not cancel each other out, the errors in the
pretest were transformed into a rightward error (i.e.,
positive sign). In addition, the errors during practice and
in the posttest and retention test were adjusted such that the
magnitude and the sign of the differences with the pretest
were maintained.
Subsequently, we submitted constant errors (i.e., accura-
cy) and variable errors (i.e., consistency) in perceived
direction and putting direction to separate 3 (group:
perception training, action training, control) × 3 (test:
pretest, posttest, retention test) ANOVAs with repeated
measures on the last factor. Huyn–Feldt corrections to the
degrees of freedom were applied in the case of any
violations of sphericity, and partial eta-squared (ηp
2) values
were computed to determine the proportion of total
variability attributable to each factor or combination of
factors. Post hoc comparisons were conducted using
Tukey’s HSD test (p < .05). One-sample t-tests with the
Šidák correction for multiple comparisons were used to
examine whether the constant errors were significantly
larger than zero (i.e., no error).
Finally, the accuracy and consistency during perception
training and action training were calculated in 12 blocks of
12 trials. This was based on the 5-cm distance interval
feedback that was provided to the participants. The constant
error (i.e., accuracy) and variable error (i.e., consistency) in
perceived direction for the perception-training group and
the putting direction for action-training group were submit-
ted to a 12 (block: 1 to 12) ANOVAwith repeated measures.
Additionally, two-tailed one-sample t-tests were used to
assess whether the constant directional errors were larger
than zero (i.e., no error).
Results and discussion
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate the constant and variable errors in
the pretest, posttest, and retention test for the putting task
2304 Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2298–2308and the pointing task, respectively. Figure 4 shows that
putting accuracy (i.e., the constant error) was reduced only
for the action-training group and that this increase in
accuracy was maintained during retention. This was
confirmed with significant effects for test, F(2, 44) =
11.85, p < .001, ηp
2 = .35, and the test × group interaction,
F(4, 44) = 4.82, p < .05, ηp
2 = .31, for the constant putting
error. The effect of group was not significant, F(2, 22) =
0.52. Post hoc comparisons indicated that the directional
errors in the posttest and retention test were significantly
smaller than in the pretest, but this decrease occurred only
for the action-training group. In addition, t-tests showed
that the directional errors were significantly larger than
zero, except for the errors of the action-training group in the
posttest and retention test, ts < 2.0, ps > .08. A
subsequent ANOVA on the variable directional errors
revealed no significant increase in consistency of putting,
although the effect of test was nearly significant, F(2, 44) =
3.03, p =. 0 7 ,ηp
2 =. 1 2 .
Figure 5 shows a similar pattern of findings for the
perception task. Thus, significant effects for test, F(2, 44) =
7.00, p <. 0 5 ,ηp
2 = .24, group, F(2, 22) = 7.31, p <. 0 5 ,ηp
2 =
.40, and the test × group interaction, F(4, 44) = 3.88, p <. 0 5 ,
ηp
2 = .26, were found for the constant perception error. Post
hoc comparisons indicated that the directional error of the
perception-training group was significantly smaller in the
posttest and retention test, in comparison with the pretest. In
addition, t-tests showed that perception errors were signifi-
cantly different from zero, with the exception of the errors of
the perception-training group in the posttest and retention
test, ts < .81, ps > .44. In sum, with practice, only the
perception training had reduced the perceptual error to zero.
The ANOVA for the variable error revealed that consistency
of the directional judgments was significantly affected by test
only, F(2, 44) = 6.01, p < .01, ηp
2 = .22. Post hoc
comparisons indicated that variable error was significantly
reduced in the retention test, as compared with the pretest.
Finally, Figs. 6 and 7 depict the changes in accuracy and
consistency of the action-training and perception-training
groups, respectively. They show that the largest perfor-
mance gains were achieved during the initial training
blocks, which is suggestive of a typical exponential
learning curve. This was confirmed by significant effects
of block for putting error, F(11, 66) = 3.10, p < .01, ηp
2 =
.34, and perception error, F(11, 88) = 2.47, p < .05, ηp
2 =
.24. Post hoc comparisons indeed indicated that the
constant errors were significantly larger in the first two
blocks, as compared with the two final practice blocks. In
addition, two-tailed one-sample t-tests showed that from
Fig. 4 Constant errors in putting for the pre-, post-, and retention
tests. Error bars indicate variable error, and asterisks indicate errors
that are significantly different from zero (*p < .05)
Fig. 5 Constant errors in perceived direction for the pre-, post-, and
retention tests. Error bars indicate variable error, and asterisks indicate
errors that are significantly different from zero (*p < .05)
Fig. 6 Constant error (black line) and variable error (gray line) in
putting as a function of blocks of 12 trials during practice. Asterisks
indicate errors that are different from zero (*p < .05)
Atten Percept Psychophys (2011) 73:2298–2308 2305block 9, putting errors were not significantly different from
zero (i.e., no error), whereas for the perception task, this
occurred from block 6 onward. Finally, Figs. 6 and 7
suggest that practice did increase consistency of perception
but, perhaps surprisingly, did not result in more consistent
putting. Accordingly, only for the perception-training group
was a significant effect of block found for the variable error,
F(11, 88) = 4.94, p < .01, ηp
2 = .38. Post hoc comparisons
indicated that this decrease in variable error occurred from
the first to the second block.
General discussion
A first purpose of the present study was to examine whether
improvements induced by outcome feedback about the size
and sign of the directional error in golf putting are driven
by calibration. Indeed, the reduction of the initial putting
errors to zero after putting practice with feedback strongly
points to calibration. This is further underlined by the
gradual increase in accuracy (i.e., decrease in constant
error) during practice. It must be acknowledged that
although the findings are consistent with calibration, the
present design does not conclusively demonstrate that
calibration occurred. A genuine demonstration of a rescal-
ing between information and task variables (i.e., presum-
ably, for putting, this task variable is the orientation of the
club head at impact) requires that the informational variable
is varied (e.g., by manipulating distance between the ball
and hole and/or the head position relative to the ball).
Nevertheless, the results show that this putative calibration
was relatively permanent; that is, putting accuracy was
maintained on a 1-week retention test. As far as we know,
and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, this is the first study
framed within an ecological theory of learning to investigate
and suggest that calibration can lead to relatively permanent
changes between informational and task variables (cf.
Withagen & Caljouw, 2011). It is perhaps illustrative to
compare the present interpretation with that in a recent
report by Cavina-Pratesi, Kuhn, Ietswaart and Milner
(2011). These authors investigated real and pantomimed
reaching movements of magicians. Unlike nonmagicians,
for whom pronounced kinematic differences were observed
between real and pantomime grasping, among magicians
the kinematics of the two types of grasping were nearly
identical. The authors suggested that with sustained practice
the magicians had recalibrated the control of the reaching
movements from information of the real object toward
information from a spatially separate location. An analo-
gous interpretation for the present findings would be that
the outcome feedback during putting practice led the
participant to aim for a “ghost” hole next to the real hole,
as if the golfer compensated for perceptual distortion.
Instead, we argue that the relation between the visual
information and the putting action is adjusted, rather than
corrections being made for a misperception of the location
of the target (see also Van Lier et al., 2011). This is
supported by the observation that improvements in putting
accuracy are not contingent upon improvements in percep-
tion of the direction of the perfect aiming line.
The findings with regard to the perception of the
direction of the perfect aiming line were similar, although
the increase in perceptual accuracy during practice seemed
to occur much more rapidly than for putting. A more
notable distinction between the putting and perception tasks
is related to the consistency or variability of performance.
For the perception task, consistency increased very rapidly
after 10 to 20 trials only. Also, in line with earlier
observations for length and distance perception (e.g.,
Gibson & Bergman, 1954; Wagman et al., 2008; Withagen
& Michaels, 2004), these increases in consistency seem not
to have depended on feedback, since increases were not
restricted to the perception-training group, but also became
apparentintheretentiontestfortheaction-trainingandcontrol
groups. By contrast, for the action task, changes in consisten-
cy were observed neither from the pretest to the posttest or
retention test nor during practice. It is not particularly clear
why, but one suggestion may be that standardization of
movement occurs relatively late during the learning of action.
For example, Koedijker et al. (2011)h a v er e c e n t l yp r o p o s e d
that automatization (i.e., as indicated by reliance of move-
ment execution on working memory) of a table tennis
forehand stroke transpired before standardization of the
stroke. Irrespective of whether this proposal is correct, the
divergent patterns for consistency suggest that calibrations
for the putting and the perception tasks were not identical.
The main purpose, however, was to examine transfer of
calibration. Perception training resulted in enhanced per-
ception of direction but did not reduce the directional errors
Fig. 7 Constant error (black line) and variable error (gray line) in
perceived direction as a function of blocks of 12 trials during practice.
Asterisks indicate errors that are different from zero (*p < .05)
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putting accuracy but did not lead to reliable improvements
in the perception of direction of the perfect aiming line. In
other words, we found no evidence that transfer of
calibration between action and perception occurred. Nor
was there evidence to support the contention of transfer of
calibration with respect to consistency or variability of
performance. The action training, however, did result in an
increased consistency of the perceptual judgments, but this
cannot be attributed to the training, since the control group
showed a similar increase in consistency. These findings are
in line with the proposal of the existence of functionally
distinct systems for the use of information in action and
perception (Milner & Goodale, 1995, 2008) but are much
more difficult to reconcile with ideas of a common
informational, or representational, basis for action and
perception (Hommel et al., 2001: Prinz, 1997, 2006). The
putting action and the perception of direction are best
understood as giving rise to separate couplings between
task and informational variables. These couplings may
entail not only distinct task variables (i.e., T(t)), but also
distinct informational variables (i.e., I(t)), even though both
tasks critically depend on information about the direction of
the perfect aiming line. Thus, Van Lier et al. (2011); see also
Johnston et al., 2003) demonstrated that the perception of
direction of the aiming line (see Experiment 1 above) was a
function of head–eye position with respect to the ball, while
directional error in putting accuracy was immune to
differences in head–eye position. This indicates the use of
different informational variables in the control of the
putting action and the perception of direction. If the
calibration or scaling of an informational variable to a task
variable is unique to a particular coupling, transfer of
calibration between the two tasks is unlikely.
The absence of transfer is contrary to previous suggestions
by Van Lier et al. (2011). They observed that expert golfers,
relative to novice golfers, tended to produce leftward errors
in the perception of the perfect aiming line (see Fig. 1).
Becausethenoviceplayersmaderightwarderrorsinputting,it
was argued that the calibration of the putting action induced
by practice would have transferred to the perception of
direction of the aiming line. The present findings, however,
did not reliably show this parallel leftward shift in perception.
Yet the novice participants’ practice in the present study was
limited to only 144 putts over 3 days. This strongly contrasts
to expert golfers who have made thousands of putts over at
least 10 years. Clearly, we cannot rule out the possibility that
overlongertimescalesofmonthsoryears,transfermayoccur.
In this respect, it is notable that numerically (but not
statistically!), there is a trend for the action-training group,
and not for the control group, to make more accurate
perceptual judgments in the posttest and retention test than
inthe pretest,whilethiswasnotthe caseforthe controlgroup.
Visual perception plays an indispensable role in a large
variety of sports skills, including aiming skills, such as
putting in golf, and interception skills, such as hitting a ball
in tennis or saving a penalty kick in soccer, and so forth. In
recent years, a number of studies have attempted to
improve these skills through perceptual learning interven-
tions (e.g., Rowe & McKenna, 2001; Savelsbergh et al.,
2010; Smeeton, Williams, Hodges & Ward 2005; Williams,
Ward, & Chapman, 2003). Typically, researchers do this by
repeatedly displaying video clips that represent the situation
of interest (e.g., a penalty kicker in the run-up to the ball).
By providing instruction or feedback about the pertinent
sources of information in the display (e.g., directing
attention to the placement of the nonkicking foot),
researchers try to enhance a player’s perception. Yet these
interventions have resulted in mixed success. Despite
improvements in perception for the training task, transfer
to the actual action has often remained unclear. One
concern that has been raised is the degree to which the
information available in the display is impoverished (e.g.,
Abernethy, Thomas & Thomas, 1993; Dicks, Davids &
Button, 2009). In the present study, however, the
perceptual-training environment was not recreated by using
2-D displays but was identical to the real-life performance
situation. In all likelihood, a more crucial issue with these
practice interventions is, therefore, that perceptual learning
takes place independently of action. Whereas the use of
information for perception is facilitated, it leaves the
intricate coupling between information and movement
untouched (Dicks, Button & Davids, 2010; Milner &
Goodale, 2008). Perception for action cannot be trained in
isolation from action (see also Van der Kamp et al., 2008).
To conclude, we have shown that directional errors in golf
putting can be permanently canceled on basis of outcome
feedback, consistent with a process of calibration. Similarly,
outcome feedback can also annihilate errors in the perception
of the perfect aiming line. Yet the observed increases in
accuracy were specific to the trained task. Thus, no transfer of
calibration occurred between perception and action.
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